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Abstract
Policy interventions are generally evaluated for their direct effectiveness. Little is known about their
ability to persist over time and spill across contexts. These latter aspects can reinforce or offset the direct
impacts depending on the policy instrument choice. Through an online experiment with 1,486 subjects,
we compare four widely used policy instruments in terms of their ability to enforce a norm of fairness in
the Dictator Game, and to persist over time (i.e., to a subsequent untreated Dictator Game) or spill over
to a norm of cooperation (i.e., to a subsequent Prisoner’s Dilemma). As specific policy interventions, we
employed two instances of nudges: defaults and social information; and two instances of push measures:
rebates and a minimum donation rule. Our results show that (i) rebates, the minimum donation rule
and social information have a positive direct effect on fairness, although the effect of social information
is only marginally significant, and that (ii) the effect of rebates and the minimum donation rule persists
in the second game, but only within the same game type. These findings demonstrate that, within our
specific design, push measures are more effective than nudges in promoting fairness.
Keywords: default, social norms, rebates, minimum donation rule, fairness, cooperation, spillover effects.
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2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
1 Introduction
Evaluation of policy instruments is widely recognized as a valuable tool to inform policy design. Among the
variables that influence the evaluation of a policy intervention, the extent to which its effects persist over
time and spill across contexts plays an important role. For example, a key question in the environmental
economics literature is whether interventions that foster pro-social norms in the conservation of a specific
environmental resource have positive or negative spillovers to other pro-environmental behaviors (Dolan &
Galizzi, 2015; Truelove, Carrico, Weber, Raimi, & Vandenbergh, 2014).
The sign and magnitude of policy spillovers may depend on the instrument used to induce behavioral
changes. Here, we focus on two instances of nudges, defaults and social information, and two instances
of push measures, rebates and a minimum donation rule. Previous research has investigated the effect of
defaults (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008), social information (Bryan & Test,
1967; Reingen, 1978), rebates (Andreoni & Payne, 2011; List, 2011), and regulation (Cardenas, 2004; Falk
& Kosfeld, 2006) in several contexts. Previous studies have also compared the effectiveness of pairs of
policy instruments (Ito, Ida, & Tanaka, 2015; Ferraro & Price, 2013; Ashraf, Bandiera, & Jack, 2014).
However, little is known about how treatment effects would carry forward and outside the specific area
they were designed for (Dolan & Galizzi, 2015; Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study comparing all these interventions within the same design both in terms of their direct
effect on a Dictator Game and in terms of their ability to influence subsequent behavior within the same
decision context (i.e., other Dictator Game) and across contexts (i.e., Prisoner’s Dilemma).
2 Experimental design and procedure
We implemented a large scale experiment articulated in two stages in Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT),
using a pool of US workers. Overall, we recruited 1,486 participants: 738 as decision makers and 748 as
recipients. From the sample of recipients we elicited beliefs on behavior of decision makers in the main
experiment1.
Subjects received $0.50 as participation fee, in addition to the earnings from the tasks. They participated
1We also conducted a pilot study with 564 participants, consisting in a single DG with two treatments, differing in the
size of the participation fee ($0.50 and $0.70). Pilot data are used in the social information treatment and to check for the
presence of income effects in DG donations (see Section 3).
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in a first stage DG (half in the role of dictators and half in the role of recipients), and subsequently played
a second game, randomly chosen between another DG and a PD. Subjects playing a second DG kept the
same role as in Stage 1.2
In the first stage, dictators had an endowment of $0.20 and were asked to decide how much of it (in
steps of 2 cents) they wanted to give to the recipient, if any. The recipient had no choice and only got the
amount that the dictator allocated to her.
After reading the general rules of the dictator game, all subjects were asked two comprehension ques-
tions about the donation maximizing their own and the other participant’s payoff. Subjects failing the
comprehension questions were automatically excluded from the survey. Those who passed the comprehen-
sion questions (about 73% of the total) were randomly assigned to one of four different policy interventions,
in addition to the baseline case.
As specific policy interventions, we implemented two instances of nudges (default and social information)
and two instances of push measures (rebate and minimum donation rule), all of which with a focal donation
point at 50% of the endowment. In the default case, donations were pre-set at 50% of the endowment by
simply pre-marking the button corresponding to a 50% donation. This is a mild intervention, since the
player could select a different donation with very limited effort. Under the social information treatment,
we informed subjects of the behavior of the subjects who participated in the pilot study: in particular,
subjects were told that roughly half of the previous donations were equal or above 50% (this was the actual
outcome, no deception was used). The rebate treatment rewarded dictators who gave at least 50% of their
endowment, by returning half of the donation to them. Finally, a minimum donation rule, set at 50% of
the endowment, meant that dictators were not allowed to proceed if their donations were strictly below
50%.
The second stage game was either a standard DG or a PD, without any policy intervention. We
clarified that the second stage was independent from the first one and played with a different partner. The
instruction screen of the second stage DG was identical to the one of the first stage DG, thus no additional
comprehension questions were asked. Subjects playing the PD in the second stage had an endowment
of $0.10, and were asked how much of it, if any, they wanted to give to the other person (in steps of 1
cent). The amount given would be multiplied by 2 and earned by the other person. Since the Prisoner’s
2Full experimental instructions are reported in the Appendix.
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Dilemma is different from the Dictator Game, subjects assigned to playing it were asked another set of
comprehension questions (success rate of 70%).
While the DG is used to measure individuals’ altruistic tendencies (Bran˜as-Garza, 2006, 2007; Charness
& Gneezy, 2008; Engel, 2011; Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro, & Barcelo, 2016), the PD is used to
measure individuals’ cooperative tendencies (Nowak, 2006; Perc & Szolnoki, 2010; Capraro, 2013; Rand &
Nowak, 2013). Recent experiments have shown that Dictators’ allocations are positively correlated with
real life altruism in a number of situations (Franzen & Pointner, 2013; Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand,
2014). The PD is a reliable measure of cooperative tendencies (Englmaier & Gebhardt, 2016). Although
positively correlated, altruism and cooperation are two different types of behaviors: Capraro, Jordan and
Rand (2014) have shown that people who give in the DG also cooperate in the PD, but not the converse3.
All subjects participating in the main experiment completed a demographic questionnaire at the end of
the second stage.
Table 1 summarizes our treatments, and displays the number of participants for each of them. We
adopted a series of checks on IP addresses and Turk IDs to ensure that no subject took the experiment
more than once. The sample size in the second stage PD is smaller than in the second stage DG, because
of the 30% of subjects assigned to this treatment who failed the additional comprehension questions on
the PD (same success rate of the common set of questions). However, this differential attrition has not
led to statistically significant differences between the two sub-samples along observable characteristics, as
shown in Table 1 in the Supplementary Material.
For DG games, we recruited an equal number of subjects to act as receivers. Subjects assigned to the
role of receivers in the main experiment faced two belief elicitation tasks. In each treatment, subjects were
grouped with two other participants, person A (a dictator) and person B (a recipient). They were shown
the screenshots of the instructions received by person A, and were asked to guess person A’s donation to
Person B. Stage 1 treatments mirrored the ones facing the dictators. Correct guesses were incentivized
with a $0.20 reward. This design allows us to elicit recipients’ beliefs (Capraro & Kuilder, 2016) and to
observe if beliefs on DG donation in stage 1 and 2 varied between subjects depending on how giving was
encouraged in the first stage game.
3To confirm this claim, we compare the distribution of decisions in the two games in our sample and find them to be
significantly different (Epps-Singleton, p<.0000).
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Table 1: List of treatments and number of participants per treatment
Stage 1 Stage 2
DG DG PD
Treatment
Baseline 130 80 50
Default 162 96 66
Social information 153 92 61
Rebate 138 81 57
Min. donation rule 155 93 62
Total 738 442 296
3 Results
3.1 Direct effects
Column 1 of Table 2 summarizes the direct effects of policy interventions on Stage 1 behavior. Average
giving in the first stage DG is 26.7% of the total pie in the baseline treatment, in line with Engel’s (2011)
meta-analysis of 616 dictator games (28.3%). Also the type of the distribution is in line with Engel’s
meta-analysis, being, in both cases, a bimodal distribution with one mode at giving nothing and one mode
at giving half. Looking at the treatments, average donations are 28.2% of the total pie in the default
case, 32.3% in the social information treatment, 46.1% under rebate, and 55.3% under the minimum
contribution rule. Pooling together nudge and push interventions, we find that the average donation under
nudge interventions is 30.2% while the average donation under push interventions is 50.9%.
Linear regressions show that setting a default does not significantly increase Dictator Game donations,
while all other policy interventions have a significant positive effect on donations, although the effect of
social information is only marginally significant (Column 1 of Table 2 in the Appendix). Pooling together
nudge and push measures, we find that only the latter have a significant positive effect on donations
(Column 2 of Table 2 in the Appendix)
We also observe that out of pocket donations by dictators in the baseline treatment and those in the
rebate treatment are statistically the same, as the increase in donations in the rebate treatment turns out
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Table 2: Average amount transferred by treatment
(1) (2) (3)
DG1 DG2 PD
Baseline 5.338 5.550 5.560
(5.361) (5.566) (4.404)
Default 5.642 5.583 5.273
(4.944) (4.890) (4.324)
Social information 6.458 6.543 5.623
(5.018) (5.313) (4.340)
Rebate 9.217 7.111 6.070
(6.947) (6.317) (4.511)
Min. donation rule 11.06 7.204 5.839
(2.930) (6.360) (4.589)
Nudge 6.038 6.053 5.441
(4.989) (5.110) (4.318)
Push 10.19 7.161 5.950
(5.293) (6.322) (4.534)
Total 7.564 6.398 5.666
(5.599) (5.719) (4.412)
Standard deviation in parenthesis. DG donations range
from 0c to 20c and PD contributions range from 0c to 10c.
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to be entirely paid by the institution. Precisely, subtracting the rebate from the actual donation, we find
an average donation of 23.5% of the total pie, which is not statistically different from the amount given in
the baseline (rank sum, p = 0.249). On the one hand, this shows that, in our experiment, rebates do not




Moving on to the analysis of spillovers from Stage 1 Dictator Game to Stage 2 Dictator Game, Column
2 of Table 2 provides evidence that, by simple average comparison with baseline stage 2 behavior, the
effects of the policy interventions tend to persist over time, albeit attenuated. Average DG donations
increase from 27.7% of the total pie in the baseline to 32.7%, 35.5% and 36.0% in the social information,
rebates and minimum donation rule treatments, mirroring qualitatively the effects of stage 1. However,
linear regressions show that the increase of donations in Stage 2 Dictator Game compared to the baseline
is significant or marginally significant only in case of the rebate and minimum donation rule treatments
(Column 3 of Table 2 in the Appendix). Pooling the two nudge and the two push measures, average
donations are 30.5% and 36% of the total pie, respectively. Only push interventions have a significant
positive spillover effect on donations in Stage 2 Dictator Game (Column 4 of Table 2 in the Appendix)
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Coming to the analysis of spillovers from Stage 1 Dictator Game to Stage 2 Prisoner’s Dilemma, Table
2 provides evidence that Stage 1 policy interventions have no effect on Stage 2 Prisoner’s Dilemma contri-
butions. This is confirmed by the lack of statistical significance of the linear regression coefficients for all
treatments (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 in the Appendix).
3.3 Subjects’ guess of treatment effects
One potential explanation for the lack of direct and spillover effects of nudges is that our treatment
manipulations were too weak. To address this issue, we ask whether individuals detect these interventions
and correctly predict the observed effects. Figure 1 reports people’s beliefs for each of the treatments, and
provides visual evidence that they are not always accurate.
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More in detail, comparison between baseline and treated beliefs shows that people incorrectly predicted
a positive direct and spillover effect of the default treatment (see Column 1 and Column 3 of Table 3 in
the Appendix). Regarding the social information treatment, subjects correctly predicted the existence of
a direct effect, but incorrectly believed in the presence of a positive spillover effect (see Column 1 and
Column 3 of Table 3 in the Appendix). These results on beliefs, especially the one about the default policy
instrument, are reassuring, as they demonstrate that the design of these treatments was not as mild as to
make them undetectable. Finally, observers correctly guessed the presence of direct effects of traditional
interventions and their capacity to spill over (see Column 1 and Column 3 of Table 3 in the Appendix).
Pooling nudges and push measures together, we find that observers overestimated both the direct and the
spillover effects of the former, while correctly predicting the existence of direct and spillover effect of the
latter (see Column 2 and Column 4 of Table 3 in the Appendix) 4
Figure 1: Observers’ guesses across treatments
4The data on beliefs, while giving us a sense of the sign of the effects, does not allow us to say whether subjects correctly
guessed also the magnitude of these effects. The main reason is that our experiment is based on a between-subjects design and
we do not have a measure of untreated beliefs and donations for treated subjects. Quantifying the biases in beliefs, relative to
the observed treatment effects on donations, would require a within-subjects design, where data on both donations and beliefs




We investigated whether and how spillovers of altruistic behavior depend on (i) the type of policy instru-
ments used to foster behavioral changes, and (ii) the behavioral context in which spillovers are measured.
Results show that, at least with our choices of policy interventions and contexts, push measures (rebates
and minimum donation rules) are more effective than nudges (defaults and social information) in fostering
DG giving directly, and in generating positive spillovers in terms of higher giving in a subsequent game,
but only within the same context.
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Table 1: Balance between DG-DG and DG-PD samples
DG-PD DG-DG
N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev p-value
Age 527 31.930 10.426 794 32.340 10.395 0.483
Female (%) 527 0.408 0.492 795 0.401 0.490 0.808
Happyness (1 sad-9 happy) 527 6.059 1.463 795 6.169 1.494 0.188
Experience with AMT (1 never-5 often) 527 2.831 1.050 795 2.730 1.105 0.095∗
Altruism index 527 102.349 123.228 795 108.387 124.782 0.387
Married 527 0.298 0.458 795 0.317 0.466 0.463
High school 527 0.101 0.301 795 0.122 0.328 0.229
Vocational training 527 0.034 0.182 795 0.039 0.194 0.649
Attended college 527 0.343 0.475 795 0.322 0.468 0.418
Bachelor degree 527 0.391 0.488 795 0.389 0.488 0.936
Graduate degree 527 0.121 0.327 795 0.127 0.333 0.763
Income bracket 527 4.932 2.526 795 5.117 2.430 0.182
Political affiliation (1 right-7 left) 527 4.761 1.589 795 4.713 1.558 0.589
Religious faith (1 no-7 yes) 527 3.205 2.417 795 3.589 2.507 0.006∗∗∗
Note: p-values from a two-sample t test with equal variances. * signif. at 10%; ** signif. at 5%; *** signif. at 1%.
13
A TABLES
Table 2: Regression of treatment effects on behavior
DG s1 DG s2 PD s2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Default 0.304 0.033 -0.287
(0.610) (0.798) (0.819)
Social information 1.119* 0.993 0.063
(0.621) (0.833) (0.834)
Rebate 3.879*** 1.561* 0.510
(0.755) (0.938) (0.862)
Min. donation rule 5.720*** 1.654* 0.279
(0.526) (0.907) (0.852)
Nudge 0.700 0.503 -0.119
(0.547) (0.724) (0.729)
Push 4.853*** 1.611** 0.390
(0.562) (0.784) (0.746)
Constant 5.338*** 5.338*** 5.550*** 5.550*** 5.560*** 5.560***
(0.470) (0.469) (0.622) (0.621) (0.622) (0.620)
Number of Obs 738 738 442 442 296 296
R-Squared 0.160 0.147 0.016 0.013 0.004 0.003
Note: OLS regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses. * signif. at 10%; ** signif. at 5%;
*** signif. at 1%.
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Table 3: Regression of treatment effects on guesses of behavior
Guess s1 Guess s2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Default 3.069*** 2.048***
(0.560) (0.591)










Constant 4.611*** 4.611*** 4.472*** 4.472***
(0.427) (0.426) (0.438) (0.437)
Number of Obs 747 747 749 749
R-Squared 0.123 0.121 0.024 0.022
Note: OLS regressions, robust standard errors in parentheses. * signif. at 10%;






The first four screens were the same across treatments.
Screen 1. This is the first part of the HIT. You have been paired with another participant. The amount
of money you can earn depends only on your choice. You are given 20c and the other participant is given
nothing. You have to decide how much, if any, to give to the other participant. The other participant has
no choice, is REAL, and will really receive your donation. No deception is used. You will really get the
amount of money you decide to keep.
Screen 2. Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand the rules. Remember that you have
to answer all of these questions correctly in order to get the completion code. If you fail any of them, the
survey will automatically end and you will not get any payment.
Screen 3. What is the donation by you that maximizes your bonus? (Here participants could select any
amount of money between 0c and 20c, with a 2c increase)
Screen 4. What is the donation by you that maximizes the other participant’s bonus? (Here participants
could select any even amount of money between 0c and 20c)
Screen 5 (baseline). Congratulations, you have answered both comprehension questions correctly! It is
now time to make your choice. What amount will you give to the other person? (Here participants could
select any even amount of money between 0c and 20c)
Screen 5 (default). Congratulations, you have answered both comprehension questions correctly! It is
now time to make your choice. What amount will you give to the other person? (Here participants could
select any amount of money between 0c and 20c, with a 2c increase. The only difference with the baseline
treatment is that the option 10c was pre-selected).
Screen 5 (social information). Congratulations, you have answered both comprehension questions cor-
rectly! It is now time to make your choice. IN AN IDENTICAL EXPERIMENT CARRIED OUT TWO
WEEKS AGO ON MTURK, ABOUT 50% OF THE PARTICIPANTS GAVE 10c OR MORE. What
amount will you give to the other person?
Screen 5 (rebate). Congratulations, you have answered both comprehension questions correctly! It is
now time to make your choice. FOR EVERY CENT THAT YOU GIVE TO THE OTHER PERSON, WE
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WILL GIVE YOU BACK 0.5c, PROVIDED THAT YOU GIVE 10c OR MORE. What amount will you
give to the other person?
Screen 5 (minimum donation rule). Congratulations, you have answered both comprehension questions
correctly! It is now time to make your choice. YOU WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO GIVE LESS THAN
10c. IF YOU DECIDE TO GIVE LESS THAN 10c, THE SURVEY WILL STOP AND ASK YOU TO
REVISE YOUR DECISION. What amount will you give to the other person?
Recipients
The first, the second, and the fourth screens were the same across conditions:
Screen 1. This is the first part of the HIT. Your role is to guess how a participant (PERSON A) will
behave towards another participant (PERSON B). You will win 20c if you make the right guess. The
screenshots below show the instructions presented to Person A.
Screen 2. This contained a screenshot of the instructions seen by the dictators in their Screen 1.
Screen 3. This contained a screenshot of the instructions seen by the dictators in their Screen 5.
Screen 4. What amount do you believe Person A will give to Person B? (Here participants could select
any even amount of money between 0c and 20c).
B.2 Stage 2
Dictator Game
These instructions were exactly the same as those of the baseline condition in Stage 2. The only slight
difference was in Screen 1, which started with the sentence: This is the second part of the HIT. You have
been paired with another participant, different from the one you were paired with before. The amount of
money you can earn depends only on your choice.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Screen 1. This is the second part of the HIT. You have been paired with another participant, different
from the one you were paired with before. The amount of money you can earn depends on your choice and
also on the choice of the other participant. You are both given 10c and you have to decide how much, if
any, to transfer to the other person. Any cent you decide to transfer will be multiplied by 2 and earned by
the other participant. Any cent you decide not to transfer will be earned by yourself, but without being
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multiplied by any factor. Thus: If both you and the other participant decide to transfer all of your money
to each other, then you both end this part of the HIT with 20c If you decide to keep all of your money
and the other participant decides to transfer all of his money, then you end this part of the HIT with 30c
and the other participant ends this part of the HIT with 0c. If you decide to transfer all of your money
and the other participant decides to keep all of his money, then you end this part of the HIT with 0c and
the other participant ends this part of the HIT with 30c. If both you and the other participant decide to
keep all of your money, then you both end this part of the HIT with 10c. The other participant is REAL,
and will really make a choice. No deception is used. You will really get the amount of money you decide
to keep plus twice the amount that the other participant decides to transfer to you.
Screen 2. Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand the rules. Remember that you have
to answer all of these questions correctly in order to get the completion code. If you fail any of them, the
survey will automatically end and you will not get any payment.
Screen 3. How much should YOU transfer in order to maximize YOUR bonus? (Here participants
could select any amount of money between 0c and 10c).
Screen 4. How much should YOU transfer in order to maximise THE TOTAL BONUS bonus (i.e. the
sum of your and the other participant’s bonus)? (Here participants could select any amount of money
between 0c and 10c).
Screen 5. How much should THE OTHER PARTICIPANT transfer in order to maximize THE TOTAL
bonus (i.e., the sum of your and the other participant’s bonus)? (Here participants could select any amount
of money between 0c and 10c).
Screen 6. How much should THE OTHER PARTICIPANT transfer in order to maximize THEIR
bonus? (Here participants could select any amount of money between 0c and 10c).
Screen 7. Congratulations! You have passed all comprehension questions. It is now time to make your
choice. How much do you want to transfer to the other participant? (Here participants could select any
amount of money between 0c and 10c).
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